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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
the promisee, the subscription agreement is treated as a mere offer
that may be revoked any time before it is accepted by the promisee.14
In these cases, the unilateral contract is said to arise when the prom-
isee connences performance as an acceptance, and the courts do not
follow the well-established rule of contract law that only full per-
formance of the requested act will be deemed an acceptance of the
offer."' However, the position of the courts is in accord with the
Restatement. 16
Insofar as the noted policy of the courts to sustain the validity
of these agreements whenever a counter promise of the promisee can
be implied, or whenever the promisee has sustained any legal detri-
ment in reliance upon the promised gift,17 is a wise and a desirable
one, it would seem advisable for the courts to state frankly that these
cases form an exception to the strict rules of consideration, and that
the doctrine, as applied to charitable subscriptions, has been modified
and qualified by the doctrine of promissory estoppel.18
E. D. R.
COMMON CARRIERS-NEGLIGENCE-DUTY TOWARD PASSENGER
UNDER DIsABILITY.-Plaintiff's intestate was waiting for a train in
defendant's subway station when he fell upon the tracks. A fellow
passenger and two station agents removed the deceased from the
tracks and assisted him to a bench some eight feet from the edge of
the platform. It was apparent that the man was laboring under a
physical disability, but when this fact was pointed out to the station
agent, he declined to take any action. Subsequently, plaintiff's intes-
tate once again fell upon the tracks, and this time was killed by one
of defendant's trains. Plaintiff contends (a) that the station agents
14 Pratt v. Trustees, 93 Ill. 475 (1879) (subscriber's offer was revoked by
his death); Cottage Street Methodist Church v. Kendal, 121 Mass. 528, 23
Am. Rep. 286 (1877) (promisee had incurred no liabilities).
15 Peterson v. Pattburg, 248 N. Y. 86, 161 N. E. 428 (1928); Sonino v.
Magrini, 225 App. Div. 536, 234 N. Y. Supp. 63 (1929); see WHITNEY, CON-
TRACTs (3d ed. 1937) § 34.
Is RESTATEMENT, CONTRAcTS § 45, "If an offer for a unilateral contract is
made, and part of the consideration requested in the offer is given or tendered
by the offeree in response thereto, the offeror is bound by a contract, the duty
of immediate performance of which is conditional on the full consideration
being given or tendered within the time stated in the offer, or if no time is
stated therein, within a reasonable time."
17 Incurring liabilities or sustaining a detriment in reliance upon a promise
is not consideration unless that act or detriment was requested by the promisor
as the price for his promise. See WHITNEY, CONTRACTS (3d ed. 1937) § 45;
WLiSTON, CONTRACTS (1924) § 112.
Is See Cardozo, Ch. J., concurring in Allegheny College v. Nat. Chautauqua
County Bank of Jamestown, 246 N. Y. 269, 159 N. E. 173 (1927); ASHLEY,
CONTRAcTs (1911) §40.
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were negligent when deceased was first removed from the tracks,
(b) that defendant's motorman was negligently operating the train
and this negligence was the proximate cause of the death of the vic-
tim. The Appellate Division reversed a decision of the trial court
in favor of the plaintiff.' On appeal, held, reversed and new trial
granted. O'Hanlon v. Murray, 285 N. Y. 321, 34 N. E. (2d) 339
(1941).
At the time of the accident, the relationship of passenger and
carrier was in existence between plaintiff's intestate and defendant.-
This relationship imposes certain duties. Although a common car-
rier is not an insurer of the passenger's safety, there is a duty to
exercise sufficient care to provide for the reasonable comfort and
safety of the passenger.3 However, towards those incapable of car-
ing for themselves, a greater duty is imposed on the carrier.4  To-
wards such persons, the carrier owes a duty to exercise sufficient
care, in view of the disability, to prevent their being injured.5 This
duty arises when the carrier becomes aware of the passenger's condi-
tion.6 In the instant case, when the station agent noted deceased's
disability, defendant became bound to care for deceased until he was
fit to resume travel or to place him in the custody of the proper officer.
Defendant did neither. Thus, plaintiff's first contention was well
founded.
However, the trial judge also permitted the case to go to the
jury on the question of the negligent operation of the train. The
jury was asked to decide whether, with the exercise of due care, de-
fendant's motorman could have stopped the train in time to prevent
the accident. The testimony on this point was uncorroborated and
was contradicted by the witness himself on cross-examination. There-
fore, no issue of fact was raised which should have been presented
to the jury.7 Whether there is any evidence tending to prove a fact
is a question of law.8 In the instant case, the Court of Appeals has
I Unanimously reversed on the ground that no actionable negligence of
defendant was established. O'Hanlon v. Murray, 259 App. Div. 808, 19 N. Y.
S. (2d) 655 (1st Dep't 1940). Motion for reargument being denied in 259 App.
Div. 885, 20 N. Y. S. (2d) 1017 (1st Dep't 1940), plaintiff now appeals.
2 Sanchez v. Pacific Auto Stages, 116 Cal. App. 392, 2 P. (2d) 845 (1931).
"The relationship of carrier and passenger arises when the passenger enters
with intent to pay or pays for entrance into the vehicle or carriage * * * It is
not necessary in order to create the relation that the passenger should have
actually entered the vehicle."
3 Carroll v. Staten Island R. R, 58 N. Y. 126 (1874) ; McPadden v. N. Y.
Cent R. R., 44 N. Y. 478 (1871).
4 Wells v. N. Y. Cent. & H. R. R, 25 App. Div. 365, 49 N. Y. Supp. 510
(4th Dep't 1898).
5 Fagan v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 220 N. Y. 301, 115 N. E. 704 (1917).6 Middleton v. Whitridge, 213 N. Y. 499, 108 N. E. 192 (1915), reV'g, 156
App. Div. 154, 141 N. Y. Supp. 104 (lst Dep't 1913).
7 Schlacter v. Dowling, 257 App. Div. 1011, 13 N. Y. S. (2d) 628 (2d
Dep't 1939).
8 4 FoRD, EVIDENCE (1st ed. 1935) 2781.
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decided 0 that the evidence adduced by plaintiff's witness was insuffi-
cient to present a question of fact.' 0 Since insufficient evidence is,
in law, no evidence, it was improperly considered by the jury 11 and
the case therefore was sent back for a new trial.
C. McC.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS - POLICE
POWER.-The petitioner, for himself and all others similarly situated,
invokes the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution and
the Constitution of the State of New York I in support of his challenge
to the validity of that part of a regulation 2 promulgated by the Board
of Health of the City of New York, which requires of an applicant
for a Class C permit 3 that he "have been a bona-fide independent
individual milk distributor in this city prior to June 1, 1939." 4 A
license having been denied him, he sought a mandatory order to com-
pel the Board to grant him a license, and his motion was denied at
Special Term. Upon leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals, held,
three judges dissenting, affirmed. The power to regulate the issuance
of licenses being discretionary under the New York City Charter,6
the issue in the case depends on whether or not the discretion has been
abused and hence must be confined to a search in the record for facts
which will justify its exercise in such a way as to work a limitation
in favor of persons who were dealers prior to June 1, 1939. The
record discloses that (1) those who were engaged as small distribu-
tors before June 1, 1939, through compliance with previous regulation
of the Board of Health, had invested in capital equipment which might
have been impaired by indiscriminate licensing of new competitors;
(2) the milk market in New York City cannot sustain as many small
dealers as there are applicants for Class C licenses; and (3) indis-
criminate licensing would increase the number of dealers too greatly
to admit of adequate supervision by the Board of Health, to the detri-
9 When the Appellate Division reverses a decision entered in plaintiff's
favor upon a jury's verdict and dismisses the complaint upon the merits, the
Court of Appeals must determine whether there was evidence which justified
sending the case to the jury. Cornbrooks v. Terminal Barber Shops, 282 N. Y.
217, 26 N. E. (2d) 25 (1940).
'o See Rippey, J. (concurring in part in instant case, p. 324).
21 Race v. Krum, 222 N. Y. 410, 118 N. E. 853 (1918) ; Matter of Case,
214 N. Y. 199, 108 N. E. 408 (1915).
'Art. I, § 11.
2 Regulation 3-a, subd. 3-b (3).
3 To deal in milk as a one-vehicle dealer who does not maintain a pasteur-
ization plant or milk depot but who utilizes the facilities of a plant or depot in
New York City which is licensed by the Board of Health.
4 Regulation 3-a, subd. 3-b (3).
5 § 558-f.
[ VOL. 16
